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The economic transition introduced after the fall of the Communist regime aims at 
supplanting past statě ownership with new owners able to transform industrial pro­
duction to meet the requirements of the market. In the planned economy, public 
ownership had always been an empty phrase. What happened gradually was that the 
centre lost power to instruct and control the enterprises, the latter supplying the plan­
ners in Prague with data tailored to further the interests of the enterprise sphere. In 
particular in the 70s and 80s, the statě was reduced to an impotent coordinator, and the 
economy was more centrally administered than planned *. During the brief time since 
1989, a stream of changes in the formal institutional structure has been initiated. 
These changes have been directed toward recreating the basic parameters of Western 
market economies: e. g. removing price controls, freeing the central bank from politi­
cal supervision, enacting legislation to protéct private property, etc. This period, from 
latě 1989 to the end of 1994, marks also the finalization of the "second privatization 
wave". Precisely the withdrawal of statě ownership has been declared to be the major 
instrument of changing the economy. Only thus could, what was called "the economy 
of social indolence" which had permitted the enterprises to degenerate into social insti­
tutions, be terminated2. It is the changing balance of statě and non-state in the years 
since 1989 that will be analyzed here. Attempts will be made to show how extensive 
statě control has been in the course of transition. The anti-state rhetoric of Prime 
Minister Václav Klaus has at all stages been particularly strong3. As will be shown, this 
has granted considérable autonomy to managers when preparing their enterprises for 
sále. On the other hand, for various reasons, the government has prevented the 
introduction of market mechanisms that can result in the closure of unprofitable 
units, thus keeping unemployment and social tensions at a remarkably low point. This 
is achieved in two ways, one being a very confusing muddle of crossownership of 
enterprises, investment funds and banks, the second the lack of efficient bankruptcy 
legislation. 
The considérable role played by the statě during the whole transition is per se no 
reason for criticism. There was no propertied middle class in the Czech lands to push 
1
 An excellent analysis is M1 č o c h, Lubomír: The Behaviour of the Czechoslovak Enterprise 
Sphere-A surveyof microeconomic works of 1968-89. Prague 1992. 
2
 Ibid. 382. 
3
 For a discussion of the basic tenets of Václav Klaus' approach, see M a r t i n s e n , Kare Dahl: 
Václav Klaus und die politische Stabilität in der Tschechischen Republik. Osteuropa 11 
(1994) 1057-1070. 
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for reforms, no private share of the market that could be trusted to expand and rapidly 
supplant the statě as owner of the large industrial enterprises. The importance of the 
statě as carrier of the reforms was therefore evident right from the start of transition. 
It was clearly up to the government to be the first mover, relying on the legislature to 
make appropriate legislative changes and thus formally change the property rights. It 
was the task of the executive, the statě bureaucracy, to také care of the implementation. 
At the samé time the executive branch itself was changed utterly in the course of tran­
sition; new entities were created while others were dismantled. 
This underlines what may be called the double paradox; the government was ob-
liged to use the statě bureaucracy in order to withdraw the statě from industry. Thus, 
the statě had to be given the tools required to implement the institutional changes by 
the government. This poses the question whether the government is technically cap-
able and politically able to do this4. Technical capability refers to the overall transition 
stratégy and the quality of the separate measures aimed at transformingproperty rights, 
the political ability and the political strength of both the government and the forces 
opposing the changes. Furthermore, it should be asked whether the government is 
willing to let the statě act as "a construction manager, dispatcher, programmer, labo-
ratory assistant, tutor and arbitrator"5. After all, the past had taught all (including civil 
servants) to regard the statě as interfering and blocking independent initiative. The dis-
like of the statě, albeit understandable and easily explainable, made it difficult in the 
Czech political discourse to look at ways the statě could be ušed to promote economic 
efficiency. State participation in economic development is regarded as indispensable in 
most market economies, yet a basic criterion is that the role of the statě should be 
transparent and subject to clear-cut guidelines laid down by the politicans. Only thus 
can economic and political lobbyism be detected, and democratic control be exerted. 
Transparency, here understood as the ability to identify the ownership interests at 
stake in the transition, is what will be analyzed below. 
It is important to underline the conceptual point of departure of the transition pro-
cess: transformation of the economy and consolidation of democracy. Both raise a 
number of constituent questions that may be addressed separately, without paying 
attention to their inter-linkage. Yet as often is the čase when the new property rights 
are analyzed without taking the political context into consideration, the conclusion 
ends with a mere technical summary of legal arrangements. Unless the legitimacy of 
the transitional measures are included as an explanatory factor, the analyst will not be 
able to explain why the final results may deviate from what could be regarded as eco-
nomically the most optimal Solution. This concerns the sále of statě assets in particu-
lar, since the values at stake are so considérable that their allocation will have greater 
social consequences than any privatization undertaken in the West, no matter how 
comprehensive. It is therefore necessary to underline that retaining public support 
4 See L ö s c h , Dieter: Der Weg zur Marktwirtschaft, Grundzüge einer Theorie der Transfor­
mationspolitik. Baden-Baden 1993. 
5 Kovacs,J.M.: Engineers of the Transition, Interventionist Temptations in Eastern Euro­
pean Economic Thought. Acta Oeconomia 1-2 (1992) 50. In Lösch : Der Weg zur Markt­
wirtschaft 28. 
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was imperative for the government. Public support for the reforms was useful, since it 
could weaken any resistance from the former industrial lobbies and the State bureau­
cracy. If, on the other hand, the government alienated easily definable social groups, 
the costs of cirumventing their resistance would reduce the pace of reforms and maybe 
thwart them altogether. Furthermore, if a sufficient number of the voters were turned 
against the policy implemented, political instability would jeopardize the govern-
ment's position. The danger of this happening was inherent in the transition itself. 
Immediately after 1989, analysts agreed unanimously that whereas it was difficult to 
identify just who stood to gain from the changes, the immediate future would carry 
with it hardships for most of the population6. Severing the links between the State 
budget and the enterprises would mean enterprise closure and large-scale unemploy-
ment. 
It is therefore necessary to address how the government tried to involve both the 
population at large in the reforms, and more particularly, those groups in the State en­
terprises that were affected by the property rights. The changes and the redefinition of 
the role of the State were an attempt to create a corporate governance structure with a 
strong and market-oriented managerial layer, rendering impossible any reversion into 
the paternalism of the past. Such a development could not be taken as given. N o large-
scale exchange of bureaucrats or management occurred; there would not have been 
anybody to fill their place. Therefore, the formal institutional arrangements would 
have to be designed in such a manner as to provide those affected with incentives to 
restructure enterprise production. Providing the enterprises with autonomy is not 
synonymous with restructuring unless it is the interest of management to pursue it. 
The question is therefore what tools are available for the government to avoid aliena-
tion and to ensure adherence even after the enterprises have been provided with a great-
er say over their own affairs than previously. This question would have been unneces-
sary if the new owners could be relied upon to press management to undertake the 
changes required for the enterprises to become independent of State support. Al-
though owners can be created quickly by providing them with some degree of owner­
ship, an answer will depend on what their interests are and to what degree they are 
able to act cohesively to exert pressure on management. 
Defining a stratégy — "The Scenario for Economic Reform" 
A so-called "Scenario for Economic Reform" was passed by Parliament in mid-
19907. It was permeated by an emphasis on speed. This was hardly unexpected, 
despite the reluctance displayed by Slovák politicians at the time. International finan-
cial organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, and Western economists work-
ing as advisors to East European governments, clearly favoured a rapid transition8. 
6 The Institute for Forecasting, in 1989 containing both proponents of shock-therapy and a gra-
dual approach, at least on this in: Highlights of the New Socio-Economic Program of Develop­
ment of Czechoslovakia. Prague 1989. 
7 Hospodářské noviny 4 July 1990. 
8 See L i p t o n, David and Sachs, Jeffrey: Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: 
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They based their views on the urgent need to reduce the time between the dissolution 
of central planning and the emergence of market institutions since this would only 
create unpredictability for the enterprises and leave them in a statě of limbo. Yet, in the 
"Scenario", the need for speed was not based on considerations for the enterprise 
sphere, but rather to avert social unrest: "The greater the speed and the more radical 
the manner of the implementation of the reform measures, the lower the total social 
expenditure the process of transformation is bound to produce" 9 . 
The link between private ownership and a more efficient economy was given far less 
attention than the need to pro vide individual Citizens with autonomy. State ownerhip 
was identified with statě paternalism, the continued reliance of the enterprises on the 
statě. Privatization was therefore taken to mean the opposite, cutting the links bet­
ween the statě and the enterprises: 
Private ownership over the means of production is one of the main pillars of a market economy 
that functions well. However, in Czechoslovak society, statě ownership dominates while the indi­
vidual citizen's part in its production and use cannot be identified. This means that the intentions of 
the reform will be threatened if a fundamental change in these property conditions does not occur. 
Therefore .. . processesoftheabolitionof statě controland privatization will becarriedout10. 
The generál character of the "Scenario" meant that there were no clear guidelines on 
the future industrial policy the enterprises could expect would be pursued. The docu­
ment did not bring any promises concerning statě aid to ailing enterprises, nor was 
funding for structural adaption regions that could expect to be severely affected by 
transition mentioned. Omission was not restricted to these aspects; the "Scenario" did 
not identify industrial sectors the government would prefer to be reduced in relative 
importance. This is somewhat surprising since many government members, in their 
capacity as scholars before 1989, had argued particularly for the need to reduce the role 
of raw materiál excavation and heavy industry u . 
The "Scenario" failed to come up with any specific guidelines on how to privatize. 
This is understandable and not unexpected since the "Scenario" was intended as a sur-
vey of the transition, providing the fundaments of rules and regulations to be elabora-
ted at a later stage. Yet it was foreseen that privatization of small enterprises, shops 
and restaurants would be completed within a short period, a couple of years. For the 
larger enterprises, it was stated that the ownership would be changed in two separate 
stages. The first would be commercialization of the enterprises. By this was meant a 
transformation of the enterprise into joint stock companies with all shares owned by 
the statě. The second and final step would be the sále of the shares to new owners. 
It would be the responsibility of the statě to undertake these two steps, and com-
plete them in the fastest way possible. But this raised the question of how far statě 
The Čase of Poland. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (1990) 293-341. Sachs has 
worked as advisor to the Polish, Estonian and Russian governments. 
9 The Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovák Republics: Scenario of the Economic 
Reform. Prague 1990. In: O l s s o n , Martin: Vadärenvoucher?KupongprivatiseringiTjek-
kien. Nordisk Ostforum 3 (1994) 30. 
K u p k a , Martin: Transformation of Ownership in Czechoslovakia. Soviet Studies 2 (1992) 
297-311, 298 quoting Hospodářské noviny 4 September 1990. 
11 Rudé právo 9 June and 30 July 1987. 
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responsibility for the enterprises extended. Since the price achieved would depend on 
the condition of the enterprises at the time of sále, would the statě undertake the neces-
sary measures and allocate the capital required to overhaul them? There was no answer 
to that in the "Scenario". Ending statě ownership meant that the task of restructuring 
the enterprises would be the task of the new owners. At the annual meeting of the 
Czech Economic Society in latě 1993, Klaus gave a summary of the events of the past 
years, declaring that transition had ended with the implementation of macroeconomic 
balance, liberalization of prices and foreign trade, as well as devaluation and limited 
convertibility of the currency. Klaus elegantly excluded enterprise-related problems 
from transition, even though he ušed the more comprehensive concept 'transforma­
tion': "Transformation concerns the systém, the whole, and therefore transformation 
is neither modernization, nor reconstruction, nor the financial stabilization of indi-
vidual firms, because these are all post-transformation tasks . . . That is the reason why 
privatization has a specific role in the whole transformation process which sets it apart 
from privatization in the West" 1 2 . 
The "Scenario" defined the aim of transition as a withdrawal of statě ownership 
and control. How this was to be achieved was answered by the two-step stratégy for 
the statě enterprises. Yet several questions pertaining to the enterprise sphere during 
transition were left unanswered: what would the role of the statě be during transition, 
what organs would exert control over the enterprises, how would the statě attempt to 
solve the inter-enterprise debts inherited from planning, and who would be responsible 
for the privatization of each enterprise ? It is these questions that will be answered below. 
The Law on statě enterprises 
The plans for a new law on the statě enterprises that had been enacted in the course 
of the timid reforms in the latě 80s were implemented by the "Government for national 
reconciliation" in the form of a Law on statě enterprises13. The Law was intended as 
a transitional measure, when the ownership status of the enterprises changed: i.e., 
when the statě rescinded its ownership, other legal regulations would apply. 
The Law defined the statě enterprise as "a producer of goods which performs its en-
trepreneurial activity independently"1 4. The Law provided for increased managerial 
autonomy to make decisions concerning Output and sales, and to enter into contracts 
which did not exceed the limits of "appropriate business risks"1 5. With the dissolu-
tion of the planning organs, management had been given extensive de facto auto­
nomy. This was confirmed by the Law, though the statě retained access to intervene 
if management actions were perceived as a threat to the viability of the enterprise. That 
did not imply that the statě would monitor decision-making at the enterprise level to 
ensure that inappropriate risks were not taken. The statě lacked the institutional pre-
conditions for undertaking such a venture, which would inevitably have meant a 
12 Klaus , Václav: Transformation Rules: The Hypothesis of Two Cushions. Prague Econo­
mic Papers 2 (1994) 121-124, 122. 
13 Lawno. 111/1990, "On State Enterprises". 
14 F r y d m a n , Roman et al.: The Privatization Process in Central Europe. London 1993, 52. 
15 Ibid. 
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continuation of the old stream of Information and directives between management and 
the statě. What was perceived to be of greater concern for the authorities was to pre-
vent management from using its position to change the character of the enterprise by 
Splitting it up into smaller units, retaining control only over what was most likely to 
be promptly privatized and leaving the rest in the statě sector. 
Furthermore, managerial autonomy was legally restrained by the detailed specifica-
tion of the allocation of enterprise profits in diff erent funds required to maintain enter­
prise equity, research and development, wages, and some social Services. Remaining 
profits could be disposed of according to the preferences of the enterprise manage­
ment. This was not novel; the radical change lay rather in the legal protection of such 
funds from arbitrary statě appropriation. But again, statě ability to control whether 
enterprises adhered to the Law was limited due to the reorganization of statě bodies 
and reduction in the number of civil servants. Furthermore, the seemingly endless 
stream of new laws and regulations must have had a detrimental effect on their ability 
to take advantage of the access they had to monitor the enterprises. 
State control of the enterprise involved the right to appoint and dismiss the 
manager. Yet this could only be doně after consultation with the enterprise Super-
visory Council, a unit introduced by the Law. The Council was to consist of rep-
resentatives from the employees and the founding ministry in equal numbers. 
The Supervisory Council replaced the Worker's Council that had existed under plan­
ning. 
The Law left little scope to the Supervisory Council. Despite the principle of parity 
being applied and the adjective "Supervisory", the actual rights of the employee dele-
gation amounted to no more than being heard by the founder ministry and recommend-
ing changes in enterprise management. Apart from being empowered to review 
accounting Statements and the allocation of profits and make its views known to the 
founding organ, its function was described as advisory. The Council could discuss 
strategies for the enterprise, but management was under no Obligation to act in accor-
dance with its conclusions. The ability of the Council to recommend changes was 
limited by its lack of insight into decisions taken at management board meetings. 
Legally, employee representatives had no automatic right to attend as had been the 
čase under the KSC regime. Instead, the preferences and interests of management 
would be decisive when assigning employee representatives a seat. 
If the Law had given the Council access to monitor management decisions dosely, 
the ministerial appointees' resort to the possibility of dismissal would have been a 
potential danger management would have had to take into account. Being denied 
extensive monitoring rights, the threat of dismissal had little impact on management 
behavior. Furthermore, the Law failed to specify reasons for removal, although 
incompetence and corruption have been cited as valid. On the other hand, the Mini­
stry could only act on the information supplied to the Supervisory Council, and apart 
from Statements of accounts and the distribution of profits which were set according 
to fixed rules and therefore purportedly factual, enterprise management in practice 
decided what information should be made available to the Council. 
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Managerial response 
The formal supremacy of the statě as owner was undermined by asymmetry of 
knowledge between the newly created Ministry of Industry and the managerial strata. 
Enterprise management possessed detailed knowledge of the production capacity of 
their enterprise, a capacity which under the old systém had been systematically under-
estimated when dealing with the central planners. Management would be able to iden-
tify the range of outmoded products manufactured with central financial support and 
therefore have a clearer idea of the portion of their Output that stood the best chance 
of making a good profit. Although the Law had prohibited the division of the enter­
prises into new constituent parts, management was not denied the right to establish 
private firms or Workshops. This possibility enabled them to single out the most 
lucrative assignments given to the statě enterprise and transfer them to their own firm. 
Machinery and production equipment could be leased from the statě enterprises, and 
since management would be the samé in both firms, the lease would be fixed at an arti-
ficially low level. This policy also had an impact on the labour force. Often the most 
highly skilled workers would join the new firms envisaging that they would get better 
pay and more stimulating work tasks. The strict wage regulation imposed by the 
government did not apply to private firms with less than 25 employees. Thus, with the 
desire by the government to provide incentives for private enterprise as well as the 
uncertain future facing the statě sector, powerful incentives for qualified workers to 
leave the statě sector had emerged. 
The extent and impact of this kind of private enterprise are impossible to assess with 
any accuracy. It was certainly widespread as an activity undertaken "on the side", evad-
ing fiscal duties and falling outside the framework of Statistical registration16. Approx-
imately three-quarters of those engaged in private economic activities by the end of 
1992 retained their main occupation in the statě sector1 7. When the government intro-
duced compulsory social insurance regulation for private entrepreneurs in 1993, more 
than a third relinquished their private activities. The share of legally registered private 
entrepreneurs in industrial employment was a mere 8 per cent by the end of 199218. 
These data showed that industry was relatively unaffected by the grass-roots privat­
ization that went on in the economy as a whole. What is not mirrored in the statistics 
is the extent of internal resource reallocation between the different units of the statě 
enterprises, strengthening a select number at the expense of others. This was a prob­
lém referred to in the press, but it was not until latě 1993 that the füll impact of this 
reallocation became evident. What was formally referred to as the "remnants" of the 
former statě enterprises, and less formally "the living dead", had to be given consid­
érable subsidies in 1993 in order to keep them afloat and make them saleable19. It is 
relevant to question whether this could have been prevented by the statě. The statě 
representatives at enterprise level had several enterprises in their portfolio. Further-
Hospodářské noviny 20 February 1992. 
Sereghyová, Jana: Entrepreneurship in Central East Europe. Heidelberg 1993, 39. 
Ibid. 40. 
Hospodářské noviny 6 October 1993. 
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more, the Law was declared to be a purely transitory measure and it was expected that 
the impending legislation on privatization would provide enterprise managers with 
new incentives as well as relieve the statě of some responsibility for the enterprises. A 
close involvement could therefore easily prove futile and trigger accusations from 
management that statě interference persisted despite the transition. 
The Law on statě enterprises being transitional, attention was focused on the 
impending privatization. Those sectors of industry where management had benefited 
from the Law resented what they regarded as attempts to cancel out conditions 
through new legislation. In the course of 1990, when statě price controls and subsidies 
were still untouched, many enterprises had purchased considérable amounts of input 
materials. Upon the removal of price controls in 1991, they were able to reap profits 
despite falling demand. This brief period of grace ended rapidly, and many industrial 
managers had reason to fear bankruptcies would become a reality. The Union of Indus­
try, a managerial Organization embracing mainly the statě sector, published a docu­
ment in 1990 where this was reflected20. In the precept, it was stated that the privatiza­
tion process would be lengthy, and because it would be in the interest of the country 
to retain as much as possible in national hands, the transfer of property to private inves-
tors should be implemented gradually when private capital grew sufficiently to take 
over the enterprises. The first step should be the transfer of all state-owned enterprises 
to a national property agency administered by the government. This part of the 
recommendation did not differ from governmental plans then discussed in Parliament 
and the media. But the Union of Industry recommended to include on the board of the 
agency a sizeable share of delegates from the enterprises. Privatization should only be 
undertaken when the management of the firm deemed the firm ready, and the income 
generated through the sále should be returned to the firm. The documents were 
published with the intention of influencing the contents of the Law on large-scale 
privatization. 
The initiative had been taken by management in heavy industry, a sector that had 
been targeted for reductions by many government economists even prior to 1989. 
Heavy industry enterprises were aware of their vulnerable position and had set up 
a joint enterprise called Iron Metallurgy (Hutnictví železa) to lobby the authorities. 
But because the mere name would discredit the initiative, the more neutral sound-
ing Union of Industry, of which the Iron Metallurgy was a member, was chosen. 
The undertaking did not pay off in terms of government concessions, but it is no­
table in that it was an effort undertaken by management to influence the process col-
lectively. 
The Law on large-scale privatization 
The transfer of state-owned property to new owners took place pursuant to three 
different sets of legislation according to the character and origins of the assets. One law 
Svaz průmyslu: Iniciativní materiál ke koncepci deetatizace a privatizace [Union of Industry: 
Initiatory Material on the Concepts De-etatization and Privatization]. Prague 1990. 
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regulated their restitution to former owners or their heirs2 1. It applied solely to prop­
erty that had been confiscated subsequent to the Communist takeover in 1948. 
Large sections of industry, in particular heavy industry, was at that time already in 
statě hands, and was therefore only marginally affected. Only in cases where former 
private enterprises had been transferred to statě ones would property have to be restor-
ed. Small businesses, Workshops, shops and service establishments were auctioned off 
at local level in accordance with the Law on small-scale privatization2 2. 
The Law on large-scale privatization, i.e. affecting industrial enterprises, was 
passed by Parliament as Law no. 92/1991 entitled " O n the conditions of transfer of 
state-owned property to other persons" 2 3 . It was originally passed as a federal law, yet 
remained in force in the Czech Republic after the division of the country. Preceding 
its enactment, an extensive debatě had taken place in Parliament over the speed and 
manner of privatization. For some time, the role of international economic organiza-
tions and foreign advisors incited contention. Members of the Opposition claimed that 
the IMF and the World Bank exercized too great an influence on the reforms, resulting 
in recklessness and haste 2 4 . Yet the debatě petered out largely due to lack of any discern-
ible difference in the reform concepts worked out by Klaus and the recommendations 
made by the IMF and the World Bank. There were occasions when the government 
referred to the conditions made by the IMF in order to get a budgetary measure 
through Parliament, but in the working out of the privatization, international advisors 
played no more than a secondary role. The approach chosen was portrayed by the 
government as "the Czech way" 2 5 . 
The number of Czech enterprises affected by the Law on large-scale privatization 
has been estimated at approx. 360026. They were to be realized in two sales waves, and 
according to the initial time schedule, the first was to be terminated by the end of 1991, 
and the second by latě 1993. The final deadline was later extended to April 1994. The 
deadlines confirmed the determination to speed ownership change by the govern­
ment. 
Relying on the statě bureaucracy to implement the ownership changes, the govern­
ment feared a reactivation of the old informal network to the detriment of the reforms. 
Although the old ministerial structure had been altered, little staff turnover resulted. 
Law no. 87/1990 "On Rehabilitation Out of Court" and Law no. 403/1990 "On the Mitiga-
tion of the Consequences of Some Torts Concerning Property". In the čase of arable land, 
property confiscated as far back as 1944 can be restituted under the auspices of Law no. 229/ 
1991 "On Changes of Ownership to Land and Other Agricultural Property". 
Law no. 427/1990 "On the Transfer of State Ownership of Some Objects to Other Corporate 
Bodies and Natural Persons". 
Present discussion is based on the English translation of the füll legal text with subsequent 
amendments, published under the title: Privatization in the Czech and Slovák Republics. 
Prague 1993. 
For an early and unbiased analysis see P r o c h á z k a , Petr: Vliv mezinárodních měnových 
institucí na ekonomickou reformu v ČSFR [The Influence of International Monetary Institu­
tions on the Economic Reform in the ČSFR]. Prague 1991. 
This was reflected in the title chosen for a collection of articles by the prime minister K l a u s , 
Václav: Česká cesta [The Czech Way]. Prague 1994. 
Statistická ročenka České republiky '93. Prague 1993, table 19-2. p. 290. 
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At enterprise level, the managerial strata had survived 1989 virtually intact2 7. At the 
samé time, the ministries possessed considérable expertise concerning enterprises that 
had hitherto been in their portfolio, and this would have to be taken into account in 
the preparation of projects made prior to enterprise sále. As a result, the responsibility 
for compiling privatization projects for each enterprise lay with the founding minis­
try, meaning inter alia that almost all industry enterprises were part of the portfolio 
of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism (henceforth the Ministry). Yet the 
formal vetting of the projects would be undertaken by the newly created Ministry for 
the Administration of National Property and Its Privatization (henceforth MANPIP). 
The enterprises covered by the Law would, on the formation of a suitable privatiza­
tion project, be transformed into joint stock companies, all shares being transferred to 
The Fund for National Property (henceforth the Fund) responsible for safeguarding 
ownership rights until new owners had purchased it. 
Privatization projects 
Although responsibility for the privatization projects lay officially with the Mini­
stry, the sheer number of enterprises prevented the Ministry from playing an active 
part. Compiling the information required, and producing a basic privatization project 
for the enterprises was therefore transferred to enterprise management. 
The Law stipulated that a privatization project should contain "economic, techni-
cal, proprietary, timetable and other data . . . " 2 8 . The economic data moreover was not 
complete without a record of enterprise liabilities and uncollected debts. Further­
more, uncollectible debts and unusable assets were also to be listed. Added up, the 
final sum was taken to indicate the so-called book value of the enterprise2 9. The usage 
of the book-value as point of departure was fraught with problems since the data were 
based upon the institutions of a planned economy, and therefore of limited relevance 
under the new conditions. For instance the value of the industrial property had been 
based on state-set rates and did not reflect proximity to international borders or main 
arteries of communication. Enterprise earnings had been the result of statě subsidies 
for raw materials and energy, and high prices for finished products. The fact that pro-
ducers enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the domestic market also had a bearing on earn­
ings. The main export market had been the Soviet Union or the former CMEA. Earn­
ings here were influenced by state-set exchange rates. The data for the financial health 
of the enterprise were therefore of limited relevance. In particular the problém of 
There are no exact figures on exchange of management in the former statě enterprises. Ivana 
Mazálková in her discussion of the role of management in the formation of industrial relations 
concludes that the legacy of past authoritarian managerial practice has remained unaffected 
see M a z á l k o v á , Ivana: Role managementu při formování pracovních vztahů v privatizo­
vaných podnicích [The Role of Management in the Formation of Labour Relations in the Pri-
vatized Enterprises]. Sociologický časopis 3 (1994) 361-372. 
Law no. 92/1991. Section 6. 
Šafař íková, Vlasta et al.: Velká privatizace aneb Průvodce privatizačním projektem 
[Large-scale Privatization or Guide to the Privatization Project]. Prague 1991. In particular 
the chapter entitled: Oceňování majetku 39-42. 
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inter-enterprise indebtedness, i. e. financial Obligation to other enterprises nothonour-
ed when falling due, illustrates this. By December 1989 the aggregate sums for Czech 
enterprises amounted to 6.2 billion Crowns 3 0, increasing rapidly in the course of 1991 
when the projects were compiled, ending at 113.2 billion Crowns, to grow at a slower 
páce in the course of the next two years3 1. 
What favored using book-value was the fact that it would enable a relatively fast 
evaluation based on common measures of all the assets. The Law opened for the use of 
external experts, but this was doně only in a select number of large-scale enterprises 
where foreign bidders could be expected. 
A central point in the project was to provide a privatization recommendation: " . . . 
the method for the distribution of shares, their allotment (ownership interests) and 
possibly also the types of shares, as well as information about whether, and to what 
extent investment vouchers will be ušed" 3 2 . 
Although management was legally obliged to produce a project to be presented to 
the Ministry, anybody was at liberty to produce competing projects. The Law re­
quired management to supply the authors of competing projects with all the informa­
tion they requested. The decision to introduce competition at this stage was motivated 
out of suspicion that management would bias the projects to serve its own needs. Open-
ing up for competing projects proved a success at least in numbers. The number of 
privatization projects exceeded 16.000, more than four times the total number of en­
terprises33. But in some cases, management sentin several projects, and in others they 
have flooded the Ministry with recommendations for reevaluations, new data, etc. 3 4 . 
Ministerial capacity to compare and assess the pros and cons of each project was 
very limited, the number of ministerial employees being in the range of 5003 5. Their 
ability to select the most suitable project was further hampered by the apparent lack of 
any criteria upon which to base their selection, something that was indeed admitted by 
an advisor in the Ministry of Industry: "Everything is completely ad hoc because there 
are so many variables and combinations of factors"3 6. 
The lack of clear-cut guidelines was further complicated by the extreme time pres­
sure under which the Ministry was operating. For enterprises included in the first pri­
vatization wave, projects had to be presented to the Ministry by 31 October 1991, 
i. e. seven months after the Law was passed by Parliament. The Ministry was then 
given one month to assemble and evaluate the projects before transferring them to 
MANPIP. In the second wave, the number of enterprises was larger, the Ministry then 
H r n č í ř , Miroslav: Monetary and Credit Policies for Transition to a Market Economy. Pra­
gue Economic Papers 2 (1992) 109-125, here 122. 
D y b a, Karel/Svejnar, Jan: An Overview of Recent Economic Development in the Czech 
Republic. Prague 1994, 14. 
Ibid. 
Statistická ročenka České republiky '93. Prague 1993, 290, table 19-2. 
B u c h t í k o v á , Alena / Č a p e k , Aleš /M a c o u r k o v á , Eva: Statistical Analysis of the Pri­
vatization Projects. Prague 1992, 16. 
O l s s o n : Vad är en voucher? 34. - S e r e g h y o v á : Entrepreneurship in Central East 
Europe 35. 
Ibid. 
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having two months at their disposal before sending them on to MANPIP 3 7 . However, 
every step of the privatization process turned out to take much longer than initially 
planned, and the deadlines were therefore repeatedly broken and extended. Neverthe-
less, the emphasis on speed and the resultant inability of the ministerial staff to survey 
each project properly did not change3 8. 
If the Ministry failed to reach a conclusion, the competing projects would be trans­
ferred to MANPIP for a final decision. The ability of the latter to reach a verdict, 
or even to revise other projects suggested they also were constrained by the lack of 
skilled personnel, the staff counting no more than approx. 1603 9. The position of 
MANPIP later in the privatization process was relegated, when all the ministries were 
given the possibility of passing a final verdict over competing projects4 0. 
Yet this did not mean that any attempts were made to single out industrial sectors 
that were less monopolized, or sectors with better prospects for survival than others. 
If the aim of removing direct statě ownership had been to increase economic effi-
ciency, a more selective stratégy could have been applied. Service and light industries 
had clearly better growth prospects than others. The smaller unit size of the enterpri-
ses/workshops further meant that adapting behavior to meet the market would 
require less time and resources than in the čase of heavy industry. Yet based on the Sta­
tements made by Klaus where he said clearly that it would be the task of new owners 
to undertake restructuring of the enterprises, it is not surprising that no stratégy 
selectively sequencing industrial sectors and firms for privatization was applied. 
At the time of drawing up the privatization projects, some analysts concluded that the 
approach "would have minor (if any) improvements in overall efficiency and welfare 
and thus [lead] to great dissatisfaction as concerns the outcome of the privatization 
process."4 1 
Although this conclusion was based on sound reasoning when made in 1992, it pre-
supposed that the termination of direct statě ownership would mean a shift from the 
policy of soft budget constraints to a market economy where budget constraints 
would be hard, and bankruptcy a real threat. 
The formal institutional changes outlined above left enterprise management with 
new possibilities to strengthen its position. The persistence of past patterns is arresting 
given the fact that the centre was obliged to rely on the enterprises to compile the 
information necessary for implementing political aims. The difference was of course 
the fast changing institutional arrangements, removing on the one hand many of the 
monitoring functions that had been ingrained in the former bureaucracy, on the other 
severely limiting predictability and thus the time horizon for managerial strategies. 
C h a r a p , Joshua/Dyba, Karel/Kupka, Martin: The Reform Process in Czechoslova­
kia: An Assessment of Recent Developments and Prospects for the Future. Communist Eco­
nomies and Economic Transformation 1 (1992) 3-22. 
Klvačová, Eva: Kritickou rychlost privatizace nesmíme překročit, říká Ministr Jiří Ska­
lický [We should not exceed the critical privatization speed, says Minister Jiří Skalický]. 
Ekonom 15 (1993) 15-17. 
0 1 s s o n : Vad är en voucher? 34. 
Prager Zeitung no. 5, 1994. 
B u c h t í k o v á e t . al: Statistical Analysis of the Privatization Projects 11. 
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When recommending a suitable key for the privatization, management could opt for 
the widest possible dispersion of new owners, rendering Consolidated efforts to press 
management for changes less likely than would be the čase with a single purchaser or 
few shareholders. The ability of the statě to prevent managerial interests from winning 
was in fact limited. Management could exert influence over ministerial vetting of pri­
vatization projects in several ways. Supplying information to outside project designers 
could be delayed, or alternatively management would provide competitors with 
fragmented or even faulty information. Theoretically this could be remedied through 
complains to MANPIP. Although the Law allowed for court proceedings against 
reluctant management, this was regarded as a theoretical option by most since the 
courts were overloaded with cases and proceedings impossible to handle within the 
deadlines given for the compilation and vetting of the projects. As a consequence, 
competing projects often contained insufficient information, and were therefore re-
jected. 
A further reason for MANPIP to favor basic projects was that these more often 
embraced the entire enterprise, whereas competing projects tended to embrace only 
a constituent unit. Granting its approval to a basic project would savé considérable 
time for MANPIP, the alternative being several projects that were not internally 
compatible. Therefore, despite the impressive number of privatization projects sent 
to MANPIP, the result was a clear preference for projects designed by management 
during the first privatization wave4 2. The percentage of management-sponsored 
projects of approved projects was above 80 in the čase of heavy industry, more than 
70 for light industry. However, the proportion of basic projects in the fuel and energy 
sector was much lower, only 59 per cent. The government may conceivably have 
wished to take advantage of privatization to split the strong fuel and energy lobby. 
The links between this sector and heavy industry were traditionally close; under 
planning they had been able to exert strong pressure on the centre for preferential 
treatment. Once the monopoly position in the fuel and energy sector was broken 
through privatization, joint actions with heavy industry would be less likely, and 
the latter would be subject to stronger pressure for change than would otherwise have 
been the čase. That being the reason for the different ratios, would imply that the 
government was not beyond employing the privatization process as a discriminatory 
instrument4 3. 
An alternative explanation, attributing less to governmental industrial policy, con-
cerns the ínvolvement of local government in the competing projects for the fuel and 
energy sector, in particular concerning the fate of the electricity works and heating 
plants. Local government would succeed in obtaining financial guarantees more easily 
than management4 4. Moreover, it should also be added that collecting information on 
coal mine Operation is a far easier task than for instance that on a heavy industry enterprise, 
Comparable statistics for the second privatization wave not available at the time of writing. 
That is also the explanation hinted at by B u c h t í k o v á et al.: Statistical Analysis of the Pri­
vatization. 
L u k a v s k á , Lenka: Energetická politika, vysoké napětí [Energy Policy, High Voltage]. 
Ekonom 49 (1993) 21-23. 
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where the informational asymmetry between management and anyone on the outside 
with ambitions to launch a competing project often proved too wide a gap to cross. 
If the government had wanted to ensure that the basic projects focused on adaption 
to the market and profitability, this could have been achieved by tying management 
interests to enterprise earnings by granting them property rights in the form of shares. 
Enterprise management and the trade unions alike favored employee share-owner-
ship schemes. It had been the subject of a major dispute during the small privatization. 
The argument ušed by the trade unions was that if the principle of justice was so im­
portant to the government that it allowed restitution to be completed prior to privatiza­
tion, then the principle should prevail and be open for shares to be transferred to em­
ployees. That would transform the mock public ownership of the past into genuine 
ownership. Yet, since it was obvious that many of the former employees lacked suffi-
cient means to purchase outright the property in question, the trade unions demanded 
they should be given favorable low-interest loans to enable them to purchase the pro-
perties. At a closed meeting of all three governments (Czech, Slovák and Federal) in 
1990, the ministers responsible for the economic transition were close to being out-
voted on the issue by the non-economic ministers favoring employees' closed round 
auctions prior to open bidding4 5. The economic ministers insisted that the first round 
of the auctions should be open to all Czechoslovak Citizens on equal terms, only open-
ing up for foreign bidders in the second round. A compromise was reached in Parlia­
ment permitting enterprises to transfer up to 5 per cent of their shares to the employees 
(in the čase of smaller firms, a maximum of 10 per cent was permitted), but only on 
condition the enterprise covered the costs of the shares. Furthermore, the shares were 
to be sold at their book value, i. e. at a higher price than the shares could expect to gain 
in the privatization rounds. Apart from the fact that few firms possessed the capital 
required, the price of shares proved an efficient deterrent. Therefore, employee 
ownership has remained marginal4 6. 
To many representatives to the left of the government, the suggested scheme was 
not preferential enough, while others disapproved because it smacked of the old re-
gime's discriminatory practices favoring one group over another. The argument that 
ownership shares would be a just remuneration to those who had worked in the enter­
prise was rejected by Klaus, voicing concern for a just treatment also for the multitudes 
that worked in the health and educational sectors. Their place of employment would 
remain in public ownership. Any concession to those working in industry would 
leave those in public sector relatively worse off. The argument was a strong one in so 
far as the salary level was appreciably lower than in industry. 
Losing the battle over employee shares has not prevented the trade unions from 
attempting to influence the drawing up of privatization projects by management. In 
some of the cases, where management has refused to negotiate with the trade unions, 
local strikes have resulted. In 1992, when privatization plans for the brewery 
Information supplied by Mr. Igor Pleskot, Member of the Presidium of the Czechoslovak 
Metalworkers' Federation, Prague 1992. 
Div i la , Emil: Vlastnická participace zaměstnanců [Ownership Participation of Employ­
ees]. Politická Ekonomie 2 (1993) 211-222. 
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Plzeňský pivovarwere drawn up, the trade unions went out on strike to protest against 
what they claimed was the sell-out to foreigners of national heirlooms. Yet, the trade 
union concerned failed to gain any concessions whatever from the MANPIP or the 
management. Nevertheless, judging from press reports there have been more cases 
where management and labor would join forces and press the centre for lump sum 
transfers at times of financial difficulties. In particular the largest heavy industry enter­
prises, like CKD Praha, Skoda Plzeň, and Poldi Kladno, management and labor have 
pursued this policy with success also after 198947. Light industry enterprises on the 
other hand have nevěr been known to achieve similar treatment. 
More frequent, however, has been disagreement between local trade unions and en­
terprise management over-the question of redundancies. The central trade union lead-
ership has supported governmental Statements conceding that over-employment is a 
real problém making redundancies unavoidable .Local trade unions would hold a differ­
ent opinion, emphasizing instead the need to reduce clerical staff as part of enterprise 
stratégy. How strongly they would push management for sustaining employment 
would depend on internal enterprise relations and managerial perception of what could 
be gained from an alliance. What is clear is that public awareness or fear of unem-
ployment remained low in 1991-92 when the projects were made 4 8 . The trade unions 
could not singlehandedly influence the compilation of privatization projects, but were 
dependent upon managerial goodwill and need to include them. Thus, management 
could tailor the projects according to their aims. This meant that the privatization key 
suggested by management prevailed. Above all this meant a larger proportion of 
shares set aside for voucher privatization than suggested by competing privatization 
projects4 9. Since the economic motives were of secondary significance, income from 
the sále of shares being transferred to the Fund, the most likely explanation is manager­
ial desire to disperse ownership, making any joint efforts by shareholders difficult. 
Privatization projects and enterprise strategies 
Early in 1993, the economic newspaper Hospodářské noviny complained that en­
terprises hung as in a limbo without any strategies for development °. Blame was put 
on management. Apart from rendering factual information about the enterprise, and 
suggesting a privatization key to suit it, management was also required to produce a 
stratégy for the enterprise. These strategies display certain common features that 
should be mentioned since they illustrate the influence of comprehensive institutional 
For ČKD Praha and Škoda Plzeň, seeAdámková, Alena: Bez radikálního řezu to nepůjde 
[It won't work without a radical break]. Ekonom 42 (1992) 35-37. - On Poldi Kladno: 
Hospodářské noviny 11 February, and 8 December 1993. 
Low public awareness of unemployment is reflected in the opinion polls presented by 
V e č e r n í k , Jiří: Trh práce: problémy a perspektivy [The Labor Market: Problems and 
Perspectives]. Sociologický časopis 3 (1992) 319-336. 
This assertion is statistically proved b y B u c h t í k o v á : Statistical Analysis of the Privatiza­
tion Projects. 
Hospodářské noviny 20 April 1993. 
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change on managerial ability to plan, but also because the strategies suggested will 
have a bearing on Czech economic development. 
Under planning, it had been in the interest of enterprise management to underesti-
mate the production capacity and skills in order to avoid an increase in centrally set 
demands. This behavior persisted in a tendency for management to underestimate the 
development potential of the enterprise when drawing up a privatization project . 
Even Czech enterprises that were able to produce certain items more cheaply than cor-
responding Western imported products, often refrained from stating this in the priva­
tization projects, tending rather to down-grade the potentials of the enterprise and 
draw up plans for the production of less sophisticated goods. Whereas the original 
Output could have been very competitive due to the low labor costs in the Czech 
Republic, the latter alternative means that Czech products must compete with Third 
World products, thus losing their competitive advantage based on low labor 
52 
costs . 
The ability to choose a privatization project or a cooperative relationship with an 
investor, be it foreign or domestic, was further constrained by behavioral patterns 
established during the Communist period. Before 1989, the ability to solve a task was 
alwaysestimatedin terms ofhavingthenecessaryrawmaterialandlaboratone'sdisposal. 
Expertise and skills were rarely given any attention at all, the non-fulfilment of a pian 
target being explained in terms of sudden and unexpected bottlenecks in the supply 
system. This behavior has persisted in the belief that any enterprise whatsoever will 
be able to perform a given task given the availability of the means necessary; i. e. chief-
ly capital. This pattern is complicated by the fact that some enterprises were clearly 
in need of financial transfers from the central authorities to tide them over a difficult 
period, whereas others were not. However, the government lacked the institutional 
apparatus required to vet the requests and see whether the plans corresponded to the 
production potential. The result was that many enterprises drew up privatization pro­
jects where the actual production capacity and skills were analyzed as being capable of 
flourishing only given massive investment. 
Closely related to this misconception is another that also has its origins in the past, 
the belief that production of finished goods is the sole indicator of a sophisticated tech-
nological level. This misconception led to the refusal by management to become a su-
plier of semi-finished products to Western or domestic enterprises, despite the fact 
that such production is also dependent upon advanced techniques and high levels of 
skill. This attitude has been nourished by the policy of many foreign investors, who 
desired to concentrate on the manufacturing of simple products or raw materials. This 
development was mirrored in the foreign trade statistics. Overall exports have showed 
an impressive growth since 1991, but the relative share of raw materials and chemicals 
has increased at the expense of manufactured products 5 3. Unless this trend is re-
51 For a discussion of the dismal turn with respect to manufacturing of sophisticated goods, see 
Pape, Markus: Deindustrialisierung schon im vollen Gang. Prager Zeitung no. 23, 1993. 
52 S e r e g h y o v á : Entrepreneurship in Central East Europe 181. 
53 Statistická ročenka České republiky '93. 274 table 18-4. Figures for 1994 showing a contin-
ued decrease in manufactured products although with an improvement for some consumer 
goods, are found in: Czech Economic Monitor. PlanEcon Report 16 January 1995, 27-37. 
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versed, the Czech Republic will remain a supplier of labor- and energy-intensive, 
often highly polluting products to the more advanced West. 
The Fund for National Property as owner 
When a project had been agreed upon, the enterprise was thereupon transformed 
into a joint stock Company and transferred to the Fund. The Fund now became the 
sole owner of the shares of the enterprise pending privatization. The Law failed, how-
ever, to specify to what extent the property rights entailed responsibility for restructur­
ing the enterprise to meet the requirements of the market. Such an acknowledge-
ment would have contradicted the political tenets of the government, and would fur­
thermore have led to considérable costs for the statě, thus creating a potential drain on 
the statě budget and endanger the attempts to retain budgetary balance and keep infla-
tion under control. That threat was not disputed, and apart from the odd Statements 
made by the Social Democrats, nobody openly favored upholding statě subsidiza-
tion. The debatě focused instead on future use of Fund assets; since these were pre-
vented by law from being transferred to the statě budget, a sensible Option would be 
to consign the holdings back to the enterprise sphere. But also on this point, the law 
was ambiguous, section 12, point 4 reading: "The property in the Fund may be ušed 
to meet the obligations of the enterprises designated for privatization"5 4. This was 
understood to cover sales expenses, e. g. information brochures, pamphlets, hold­
ing of auctions, negotiating with potential bidders, etc. But what the "may be 
ušed" implied beyond marketing needs and restitution claims remained a subject 
of dispute since the Law failed to specify in what cases allocation of capital from 
the Fund would be permissible. In 1991, when the first scholarly discussions of 
the law were published, this clause was interpreted liberally to mean coverage of 
enterprise debts: "to enable enterprises undergoing privatization to fulfil their con-
tracts" 5 5 . 
Pledges had been made by Fund representatives that it would only support finan-
cially those enterprises that had a chance of being profitable. Yet what criteria that 
would be ušed to establish potential profitability were not elaborated. Furthermore, 
the alternative to Fund support would have been closure, and that was unlikely for 
two reasons. First, if the Fund bankrupted an enterprise, the creditors would address 
their claims for financial compensation to the Fund. That had been the outcome of the 
few cases where the Ministry of Industry had liquidated industrial enterprises. 
Second, the Option was legally difficult to implement since enterprises undergoing 
privatization were protected from bankruptcy proceedings56. Therefore, the Fund 
was forced to supply the enterprises ad hoc with capital to keep them afloat in the 
Law no. 92/1991. Section 12, point 4. 
Interpretation of Law no. 92/1991 provided by Pl íva, Stanislav: Privatizace majetku státu 
[The Privatization of State Property]. Prague 1991, 131. 
Law no. 328/1991: The Bankruptcy and Čomposition Act. Section 67: Bankruptcy and Pri­
vatization. Prague 1993, 63-66. 
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period before the new owners were ready to take over. By the end of 1993, this tapped 
the Fund for almost 24 billion Crowns, or almost half its capital57. 
In some cases the financial straits were caused by foreign firms defaulting on their 
payments. The foreign firms, often in the former Soviet Union or in the Third World, 
had imported Czech goods under statě trade agreements signed by the former Com­
munist regime. The enterprises expected the government to aid them in retrieving the 
outstanding sums. The issue of the unpaid foreign debts remained on the agenda in the 
bilaterial relations between the Czech Republic and Russia until spring 199458. 
A more important problém was posed by the emphasis on speed and the time required 
to check the creditworthiness of new owners. This was highlighted when the head of the 
Fund for National Property, Tomáš Ježek, resigned from his position in June 1994. 
According to the official explanation made by the Minister of Privatization, Jiří Ska­
lický, three intertwined problems had emerged that the Funďs chairman and board had 
been unable to solve59. Firstly, the Fund had accumulated considérable debts from the 
sále of enterprises to investors who defaulted on payment. Secondly, too much time 
passed before the sales were executed, the Fund retaining the assets longer than 
thought necessary by MANPIP. Thirdly, Fund representatives on enterprise boards 
had failed to represent the property rights of the statě6 0. Since the Law was noto-
riously vague on these aspects, a more likely conclusion is to interpret the official rea-
sons given for Jezek's demise served as cover-up for political disagreement. But wheth­
er the change of leadership should be interpreted as the start of a new Fund policy of 
spending more efforts to vet buyers is too early to say. In August 1994, the new head 
of the Fund, Roman Češka, interfered personally in the čase of Poldi Kladno and 
sacked the new owners for defaulting on payments to the Fund. The Fund together 
with MANPIP appointed new members of the enterprise board, thus reintroducing 
Fund ownership pending take-over by new owners 6 1. However, this was apparently 
an exceptional move, serving as a warning to potential bidders that the Fund might re-
scind transfer of assets. Still, no formal steps were taken to clarify the Funďs role as 
owner, or indeed set a definite deadline for when the Organization would be dissolved. 
Everything was stated to be dependent on swift transfer from the Fund to new owners. 
Transfer to new owners 
The book value of the industrial enterprises transferred to the Fund grossly exceed-
ed the savings of the population. Foreign investors could only be expected to pur­
chase certain well-known enterprises. But even in these cases, public debatě reflected 
the animosity that sometimes had been voiced over the role played by the IMF and the 
B r o m , Karla/Orenstein, Mitchell: The Privatised Sector in the Czech Economy: 
Government and Bank Control in a Transitional Economy. Europe-Asia Studies 6 (1994) 
893-928, 900. Statistical source not quoted. 
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World Bank. The fact that most foreign investors were German refuelled historical 
resentment6 2. 
The debatě over restitution had revealed resentment to what was perceived as the 
return of the former elitě to "take away the choicest bits" 6 3 . A feeling of disillusion-
ment over property changes seemed to have been widespread in the population, most 
people expecting declining living Standards to persist in the foreseeable future. In opin­
ion polls taken in 1991 and 1992, the share of the population preferring a "democratic 
socialist system, as seen in some Western societies " amounted to 35 per cent, a portion 
equalling those in favor of continued reforms6 4. This statě of affairs threatened the 
governmenťs stratégy. If the majority of the population proved to be alienated by the 
reforms, an alternative stratégy with a more gradual approach would have to be ap­
plied. That would inevitably mean the defeat of the governmental approach to the tran­
sition and the Opposition would stand to gain in the upcoming parliamentary élections 
in June 1992. Thus, both the lack of domestic capital as well as the desire to attract 
populär interest were powerful incentives for the application of non-traditional 
approaches. Selling statě enterprises to the Citizens at an affordable price would com-
bine the need to attract populär support and involvement with the necessity to ensure 
a swift transfer of property rights. Although this would imply selling the enterprises 
at less than book value, it was argued that it would be a remedy for the torts suffered 
under the previous regime. This could be doně by distributing investment vouchers to 
the population at a nominal fee. The price was set at 1035 Crowns, an average week's 
pay. The booklets were sold at the post offices, and could be bought by all Citizens 
over 18 years. The Federal government passed a decree on investment vouchers on 
September 5,1991, assigning the printing of vouchers booklets and investment stamps 
to the Federal Ministry of Finance 6 5 . Holders were then at liberty to bid for any enter­
prise by assigning some or all of their shares to vouchers. 
In the first wave of privatization, 988 firms off ered some of their shares for purchase 
by voucher, most combining direct sále to a single bidder with vouchers as payment 
mode 6 6 . But almost 40 per cent of the enterprises were to be privatized exclusively 
through vouchers 6 7 . Initially, there was little interest among the population to partici-
pate in the voucher privatization, and Opposition politicians interpreted this as a rejec-
tion of the entire reform package. It was even expected that the voucher privatization 
would be terminated after the 1991 élections when little more than half a million Cze-
choslovaks had registered. The government had reckoned with some 4 million purchas-
ing investment booklets out of a total of 11.5 million eligible persons. 
When the period of registration expired in February 1992, almost 8.3 million out of 
Die Presse 25 September 1990. - H o l u b , Petr: Český průmysl do českých rukou [Czech 
Industry in Czech Hands]. Respekt 1, November 1993. 
Rudé právo 10 June 1991. 
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[From unjust equality to just inequality?]. Sociologický časopis 3 (1992) 293-315, 314. 
Hospodářské noviny 10 September 1991. 
See K o t r b a , Josef/S v e j n a r, Jan: Rapid and Multifaceted Privatization: Experience of the 
Czech and Slovák Republics. Prague 1993, 31. 
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11.5. eligible persons had bought a booklet and had their investments registered. The 
upswing in vouchers sále could be explained by the emergence of investment funds 
toward the end of 1991. These invited booklet holders to submit their vouchers, 
and the investment funds would undertake the task of finding promising enterprises. 
AU in all, more than 70 per cent of the voucher holders availed themselves of the 
funds6 8. Some funds managed to attract considérable numbers of voucher holders by 
promising them a ten fold return within a few years. This calculation was based on the 
relationship between the initially meagre interest for voucher booklets and the book 
value of the enterprises. Thus no fund has been able to fulfil these pledges. 
Whereas all changes in ownership status of the enterprises had formerly been pre-
pared by the government and introduced as parliamentary acts, the investment funds 
emerged without any prior legislation regulating their function. In fact the first laws 
on their role and function only appeared in latě April 1992, the point in time when the 
funds had received investment points, and immediately prior to the first rounds 6 9 . 
Throughout 1991 only a very rudimentary set of criteria and rules that had been drawn 
up by the Ministry of Finance and issued as government decrees existed. Here it was 
specified that a down payment of 100 000 Crowns was required for an investment fund 
to be registered. The emergence of investment funds was perceived as countering the 
dissipation of shares, enabling more efficient execution of property rights than was 
practically possible for the individual shareholders. In the course of 1991, more than 
400 funds had been established, signalling that the desired concentration of shares in a 
limited number of funds was in jeopardy7 0. Yet despite the multitude, the 13 largest 
funds received almost 60 per cent of total investment points. On the other hand, as 
many as 313 were reported to have less than 10 million investment points each. That 
number was falling far short of the required amount to ensure profitability, let alone 
enable the funds to exert any pressure on management to restructure7 1. 
Though such minor funds turned out to have too many unprofitable enterprises in 
their portfolio, they could not be declared bankrupt. During 1991 and 1992, the politi-
cians confirmed the need for a bankruptcy law which would ensure closure of enterprises 
and funds alike that were obviously unviable, yet implementation of the law was post-
poned twice. Closing down funds would undermine public support for the reforms. As 
an alternative to bankruptcy, it was instead decided to limit the growth of funds by raising 
the required down payment from 100.000 to 1 million Crowns as from 1 January 1992. 
Furthermore, to reduce vulnerability to future enterprise bankruptcies, a fund was 
obliged to disperse its shares between at least ten enterprises, holding maximum 20 per 
cent of the shares in a single enterprise. Some funds circumvented this by Splitting up 
into several new investment funds 7 2. It was therefore decided that funds with the samé 
owner could not own more than 40 per cent of the shares in one enterprise. 
W e n d e i o w a , Petra (Managing Director of the investment fund Harvard Stock Exchange 
Company Inc.): Privatization Funds as New Owners of Privatized Enterprises. Prague 1993,2. 
Law no. 248/1192, "Investment Companies and Investment Funds Act". 
W e n d e i o w a : Privatization Funds as New Owners of Privatized Enterprises 2. 
Hospodářské noviny 22 May 1992. 
According to Wendeiowa, Harvard Capital Consulting set up 20 affiliated companies during 
1991 and 1992.Wendeiowa: Privatization Funds as New Owners of PrivatizedEnterprises 3. 
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There was no unanimous response by the funds to the legal limitations. Numerous 
reports have appeared in the press showing that most funds have feit free to flout the 
regulations73. Even when the funds were fined, they had the right to make an appeal 
to the courts. Nor are they obliged to surrender the shares but can retain them and reap 
the profits pending final judgment. Court trials being notoriously lengthy, the threat 
of legal action was no deterrent. 
More worrying has been the number of enterprises in some funďs portfolios. A few 
funds have limited their portfolio to about 50 enterprises74. But most have bought 
shares haphazardly with no preconceived plan in some cases funds are holding shares 
from more than 1000. The ability of the funds to make strategie purchases was ab initio 
influenced by the auctioning procedures undertaken by the Fund of National Prop­
erty. The basic idea was that voucher privatization, combined with other methods, 
would simulate the market. The equation of supply and demand would result in a price 
expressing the real market value of the enterprise. Yet, the voucher privatization dif-
f ered in two important ways, influencing the ability of the investment funds to make stra­
tegie purchases7 5: 
First of all, investment funds allocating their vouchers to Stocks that got fewer 
points than expressed in their book value, received their shares immediately. That 
meant investment funds would be hesitant to invest if they expected interest to be low. 
If not, they risked being stuck with their shares, whereas others would secure them at 
a far lower price, the proceduře being that unsold shares from the first round would be 
put up at a lower price in the next. 
Secondly, the decision to speed up privatization meant that the bidding rounds were 
finite. Consequently, investment companies bidding for the most populär shares 
would receive none in the first round if supply proved to be significantly lower than 
demand. If the price was inereased in the next round it was an important signál to other 
investors that these firms must have superior prospects among those offered. But 
again, the final price might not correspond to the actual market value of the enterprise, 
and thus finally frustrate the investors. 
Perhaps the most important deficiency here was the fact that no decision was made 
as to how many rounds should be undertaken before an enterprise was fully pri­
vatized. This would have been a simple matter by means of setting a limit on the 
number of shares investment funds may purchase, e. g. when 90 per cent of the shares 
allocated for voucher privatization were sold, no more rounds would be under­
taken. Instead, shares not sold in the first wave were transferred to the second. 
This has not only prolonged the sales of enterprise shares beyond the dates set in 
the initial plans, but also limited the ability of management to draw up any plans for 
the development of the enterprises, since this would depend on the approval of the 
new owners. 
The Prague Post 7 December 1994. 
W e n d e i o w a : Privatization Funds as New Owners of Privatized Enterprises 3. 
The two main diff erences are based on the discussion of the voucher privatization by B r a d a, 
Josef: The Mechanics of the Voucher Plan in Czechoslovakia. RFE/RL Research Report 17 
(1992)42-45. 
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The investment funds as owners 
The deficiencies of the bidding procedures meant that the ability of the funds to 
make strategie purchase was limited, most ending up with shares from a wide range of 
different enterprises when the waves were completed. Although the subsequent trade 
in shares has resulted in a more homogeneous portfolio, the funds still faced problems 
in developing a stratégy and implementing it at enterprise level. Not only the sheer num­
ber of enterprises meant that the monitoring ability would be restricted, but a further 
problém was posed by the legal regulation of enterprise boards f ailing to specify where 
ownership interests should be represented. The management board, the supreme enter­
prise organ making the day-to-day decisions, became the focus for contention. 
The Commercial Code permitted the members of the management board to be elec-
ted either by the so-called generál meeting consisting of shareholders, or by the super­
visory Council76. In the latter čase, funds could be outvoted by other groups and thus 
be denied a seat on management boards. In the debatě following the enaetment of the 
Commercial Code, managerial groups clearly opted for this Solution, exeluding share­
holders from management boards. In the cases where enterprises established invest­
ment funds that subsequently bought shares in their mother companies, management 
tried to confine shareholder representation on management boards to their own 
funds 7 7 . However, the banks were able to use credit conditions as a tool to get their 
funds represented. Thus the largest investment funds have gained a majority of the 
management board seats reserved for shareholders. Smaller funds, let alone individual 
shareholders, usually fail to gain any. In particular, in enterprises with good profit out-
looks, the funds are represented on management boards, often outnumbering mana­
gerial representatives 7 8. In enterprises that have been rated as less profitable, the funds 
devote less resources and are represented on the supervisory boards. This indicates 
that the funds are able to make priorities and look upon their ownership as a long-term 
commitment. The fears that the funds would "milk" the enterprises failed to material-
ize. This can be explained when focusing on the ownership of the largest investment 
funds. 
The owners ofthe investment funds 
Of the ten largest investment funds, only Harvard Capital and Consulting was estab­
lished by an independent entrepreneur. The rest were founded by banks. These were 
former statě banks that had in the course of reforms been made independent of the 
National Bank. It was expected that private banks would be established and parti-
Law no. 513/1991 "The Commercial Code". Chapter 2, Part 1, § 184-§201. The English 
translation of the text has been published under the title: The Commercial Code. Prague 1992. 
Mladá fronta Dnes 28 June 1993, quoted i n B r o m / O r e n s t e i n : The Privatised Sector in 
the Czech Economy: Government and Bank Control in a Transitional Economy 911. 
This was asserted by W e n d e i o w a : Privatization Funds as New Owners of Privatized Ent­
erprises. And has been confirmed by the empirical materiál provided b y B r o m / O r e n -
s t e i n : The Privatised Sector in the Czech Economy: Government and Bank Control in a 
Transitional Economy 920-925. 
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cipate both in the establishment of funds and in the purchase of shares. Though more 
than 40 private banks were set up, they were clearly dwarf ed by the size of the f our for­
mer statě banks 7 9. By 1993, the newcomers had captured no more than 10 per cent of 
the market in loans and deposits8 0. At the time transition commenced, all but a few of 
the bank clients were statě enterprises. Though the proportion gradually feil some­
what in the course of 1992, the largest creditor bank, The Bank of Commerce, still had 
97 per cent of its loans tied to the statě sector8 1. 
Bank ownership of the investment funds was initially not regarded with apprehen-
sion. But when it became evident that these funds purchased shares in their own fUnd­
ing banks, the lack of legislation preventing such behavior was openly acknowle-
ged8 2. The other group of investment funds purchasing bank shares comprised funds 
set up by enterprises. These, mainly smaller funds bought shares in the banks to which 
their founders were indebted. 
The de facto concentration of shares in bank funds should permit a more coordinat-
ed behavior by the owners. If ownership interests were split between investment 
funds with widely differing backgrounds, a conflict between those opting for a 
quick return on their shares and others advocating more long-term perspectives would 
have been likely. The dominance of the banks should permit the latter view to prevail. 
Nevertheless, the intimacy between the banks and the funds would also mean that the 
banks will tailor their interest rate and credit policy to the needs of their enterprises, 
even though the long-term perspectives might be negative. Thus insolvent enterprises 
would stand a fair chance of receiving bank credits to "bridge" them over in dire straits 
as well as to negotiate easier terms than private entrepreneurs starting from Scratch 
would receive. 
To what extent investment fund representatives are advocating the views of the 
banks is impossible to assert but highly likely, in so far as no measures have been taken 
to prevent any insider trading of information between the funds and the banks. In 
many investment funds a number of people simultaneously hold positions in local 
banks in the ministerial sector, enabling them, thanks to their special knowledge, to 
undertake a redistribution of wealth certain to benef it their clients. Part of this problém 
has been ascribed to the lack of qualified staff83. In the course of transition, more people 
achieve adequate qualifications and the vacant positions can be filled. But still there has 
been a marked reluctance by government to take any decisive measures to counteract 
conflict of interests. After several political scandals, the most notorious being a fund-
For a discussion, see V e n c o v s k ý , František: Diskriminace soukromých bank [Discrimi-
nation of Private Banks]. Ekonom 43 (1992). 
Privatization of Czech Banks. Ed. by Miroslav K e r o u š , Prague 1993, 2. 
Calculations based on statistics provided byKlvačová, Eva/Vandurková, Naděžda: 
Komu banky půjčují? [Who are the Banks' Borrowers?]. Ekonom 37 (1992) 22-23. 
Ib id 12. 
For a discussion of this problém, see P e 1 i k á n, Pavel: The Dynamics of Economic Systems, 
or How to Transform a failed Socialist Economy. In: On the Theory and Policy of Systemic 
Change. Ed. by Hans-Jürgen Wagener. Heidelberg 1993, 67-95. - For complaints about 
the lack of educated staff, see U r b a n , Jan: Budeme mít trh manažerů [Will we have a 
market of managers ?]. Ekonom 45 (1992) 41. 
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raising dinner hosted by the government party with many large state-owned enter­
prises paying the hefty entrance fee, minor legal amendments were suggested by the 
government in early 199584. Enterprises where the statě holds a majority of shares or 
which receive statě subsidies will be banned from making donations to political par­
ties8 5. Politicians will no longer be permitted to sit on management boards, and all 
extra income or gifts must be reported. These measures do not extend to spouses of 
politicians86, nor do they solve the problém of informal exchange of information be­
tween the funds, the banks and the enterprises resulting from the widespread cross 
ownership. 
Presenting the problems of enterprise ownership as limited to the role of the banks 
disguises the position held by the statě. This is evident when focusing not on the funds, 
but on the ownership of banks. Changes in the formal ownership of the banks shares 
did not deviate from those of the enterprise sector: i. e. they were transformed into 
joint stock companies with all the shares in the possession of the Fund of National Prop­
erty. The bank shares were offered for sále in the course of the two privatization 
waves, but government spokesmen declared that the statě would retain control over 
between 40 and 50 per cent of the basic capital for at least a decade8 7. The only other 
major group of shareholders was composed of the investment funds. Taking into 
account that virtually all had been set up either by the banks or by the enterprises, 
cross ownership may appear more confusing that it really is. The strongest share­
holder in the čase of the financial sector remains the statě through the Fund for Nation­
al Property. Whereas Fund ownership in the enterprise sector may be the undesirable 
outcome of lack of purchaser Fund ownership in the banking sector is not accidental. 
The government seems to be interested in continued statě ownership in the banking 
sector. The Statement by Privatization Minister Jiří Skalický in January 1995 that the 
privatization of the banks was only under discussion in the government, and therefore 
not imminent, supports this 8 8. He tried to underplay the strong position of the statě 
by referring to the fact that state-owned shares constituted less than 50 per cent. Yet 
this makes no difference to this position as principál shareholder. 
In the čase of the banks, the government also seems to have made eff orts to coordinate 
its role as shareholder in more a regulated manner than is the čase in industry. Under 
the auspices of the Fund, and an advisory group consisting of the Governor of the Na­
tional Bank, the Minister of Finance and the Chairman of the Executive Committee of 
Ormi - database 4 January 1995. 
There are very few enterprises where the statě holds a majority of shares. Yet, as shown here, 
the statě has considérable interest in the commerical banks. If the shares held by the invest­
ment funds are combined with those held by the State, the efficacy of the legal amendments 
must be questioned. Yet, because of the public outcry resulting from the dinner party, the 
political costs for the government will probably be an efficient deterrent. 
Dr. Livia Klausová, the wife of the Prime Minister, is a member of the board of the Czech 
Electricity Works ČEZ. She was nominated by the Minister of Industry Dlouhý. The Fund 
for National Property is the major shareholder in the ČEZ. See: RFE Daily Report - database 
114(1994). 
K e r o u š : Privatization of Czech Banks 4. 
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the Fund was established. This group meets regularly and issues guidelines for those 
who represent the Fund in the statutory bodies of the banks 8 9. 
However, State ownership is not restricted to the banks. At the end of 1994, the 
Fund still retained approx. 40 per cent of all shares transferred to it. The transfer has 
therefore been a far slower process than initially envisaged, and according to Statements 
by Roman Češka, the process will probably not be completed until 199790. But 
thereafter, the Fund will continue to represent the ownership interests of the State in 
enterprises where the government maintains a stake. State ownership will most likely 
embrace enterprises and firms that supply infrastructure Services (waterworks, rail-
ways, etc.). 
The consequence of this cross-ownership is that the investment funds are function-
ing as the extended arms of the banks rather than of the individual investors, the ability 
of the latter to influence the investment funds being very limited. Despite sug-
gestions for creating mechanisms for 'proxy voting', permitting a single shareholder to 
act on behalf of a group, all eff orts have been stranded due to lack of interest9 1. Dr. Lubo­
mír Mlčoch, a prominent economist, has concluded that what the new ownership struc­
ture actually amounts to is a tautological transformation of state-owned enterprises 
into enterprises owned by by the State92. 
Mlcoch's conclusion is partially correct formally, though it fails to reflect the whole 
truth. By transferring ownership control from the State bureaucracy to the banks, a 
greater emphasis on market-relevant criteria would stand a better chance of being 
achieved. The banks were expected to evaluate the enterprises according to market cri­
teria and only give loans to enterprises with profit prospects. Enterprise manage­
ment would be compelled to base their decisions on a similiar yardstick and thus pro­
duction would be geared to the needs of the market and not the central plan as in the 
past. This was clearly expressed in a directive entitled "Information for Enterprises 
about Economic Conditions", issued to the enterprises by the Ministry of Finance on 
2 January 1991, i. e. the day after prices had been liberalized. Here, the enterprises were 
informed that the banks were now the executors of control, and the enterprises would 
have to respond to the interest rates and credit limits imposed by the various commer­
cial banks, and not to centrally given directives as in the past 9 3. This was, the govern­
ment declared, a temporary measure until such time as more classical methods could 
be applied. What these methods amounted to was not specified, but the future in-
troduction of an efficient bankruptcy law was among them. The directive removed 
monitoring responsibility from the State bureaucracy and transferred it to the com­
mercial banks. This also implied that the enterprises were no longer to count on State 
subsidies. 
K e r o u š : Privatization of Czech Banks 5. 
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The banks and the enterprises 
The enterprises had to face the institutional changes with scant financial means, 
enterprise cash holdings having to a large degree been depleted as the result of a Shop­
ping spree undertaken in 1990, when price controls were still in place. Purchasing 
input materials at statě set prices would enable the enterprise to reap a handsome 
profit if the finished product was sold after the 1991 price liberalization. 
In a few cases, management had been able to seli the enterprise to domestic or 
foreign buyers with the consent of the founding ministry, the sum generated being 
ploughed back into the enterprise as investments. With the enactment of the privatiza­
tion laws, this practice ceased and all income from sales were thereafter transferred to 
the Fund for National Property. Enterprises owned by the Fund were obliged to turn 
to the banks to finance their needs. 
It was beyond doubt that the investment needs in certain sectors of the economy 
were considérable, though the exact magnitude was impossible to calculate in 1991. 
Estimates produced by management in the basic privatization projects were appar-
ently not regarded by the banks as relevant. Heavy industry had been a privileged 
sector in the past with easier access to capital than production of consumer goods. But 
even within heavy industry, transforming production to meet requirements on 
Western markets would require fresh capital. Given the rapid changes, management 
lacked the basis for drawing up realistic development plans for their enterprises, and 
the unpredictability of future market demands as well as anxiety about their own posi­
tion were only two of the causes of the so-called pre-privatization paralysis that set in. 
The time horizon being drastically shortened, planning more or less amounted to a day-
to-day stratégy for survival in the period immediately following 1989. This was re-
flected in the fall in investments by 25 per cent in 19919 . In the industrial sectors 
where outlook for the future was most sombre, the fall was even greater. In engi-
neeering, investments feil by more than 50 per cent, and in machine-building the 1991 
level was only two-thirds of the previous year9 5. Investments were also negatively 
influenced by the ongoing process of demonopolization. Units that were singled out 
and transformed into independent firms were suddenly eut off from internal enter­
prise capital funds. 
The ability of the banks to provide the enterprises with financial assistance was con­
strained by numerous conditions making them less than the neutral arbiter the govern­
ment aimed at. First of all the banks were short of cash, secondly their credits had been 
given to former statě enterprises with very unpredictable prospects. It was therefore 
feared that the banks would become hostage to the enterprises. The politicans had 
little faith in the banks acting sufficiently restrictively when granting new loans. To 
counteract such a development, severe credit limitations were imposed by the statě 
and remained in force tili the end of 1992 % . As in the čase of evaluating the enter-
Statistická ročenka České a Slovenské Federativní Republiky 1992. Prague 1992, 219, table 
8-5. 
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prises, the statě was at a loss over what yardstick should be applied when determining 
the limit. It was therefore decided to use the investment levels from the last years of 
planning as a point of departure. 
The fact that the limits imposed did not correspond to real needs is beyond doubt. 
But what is more interesting is that the banks exercised more caution than had been 
anticipated with the result that the credit limits were not reached. Although the Fund 
representatives on enterprise boards were given the mandáte to ensure that the manag­
er took no inappropriate business risks, the banks and not the Fund would carry the 
costs if they did so. Accordingly, the banks adopted a wait-and-see attitude, mainly 
issuing short-term credits and avoiding any sort of long-term commitment. 
A bank takeover of the enterprise and subsequent sále of assets to cover the out-
standing sums was no feasible Solution. The enterprises would fetch less than their 
book value, and this would clearly entail a loss for the banks. Yet, "bad debts" were 
more prevalent in inter-enterprise relations than in bank credits. Enterprise ability to 
service their loans differed considerably according to industrial sector and enterprise 
size. The most indebted firms were the largest industrial enterprises, and the most 
indebted sector was, not surprisingly, heavy industry 9 7. 
The monitoring of inter-enterprise debts had been reduced by the formal changes. 
The enterprises were required to provide the bank with data on liabilities when apply-
ing for loans, but the validity of these estimates was often dubious since they could 
easily omit data on defaulted payments. This, together with uncertainty of the very 
survival of the enterprise, reduced the banks' willingness to grant substantial credits 
on a long-term basis. Faced with this, inter-enterprise debts increased until signs of a 
slight dechne appeared in 1992. There seems to have been a tendency for the largest 
industrial enterprises to obtain new credits from the banks and service old loans and 
debts to other enterprises98. Thus, former inter-enterprise debts have been trans-
formed into bank loans. Not surprisingly, the share of risky loans in the portfolio 
of the commercial banks, i. e. credits the banks experience great difficulties in retriev-
ing, has increased from 2.4 per cent in latě 1991 to 23 per cent in October 1993 9 9 . This 
development has threatened the viability of the banking sector. The effects of bank 
collapse would clearly have dire consequences for all the enterprises in bank's 
portfolio, including those showing a profit. 
The statě and the banks 
To relieve the banks of bad loans, the Ministry of Finance decided to establish the so-
called Consolidation Bank in 1991. The Bank was intended as a transitional emergency 
instrument owned by the statě. In 1991 and the following year, the Bank purchased 
from the commercial banks approx. 50 billion Crown of bad loans, i. e. far below all 
estimates of the total sum of bad debts 10°. The funding for this purchase was allocated 
Č a p e k , Aleš: The Bad Debt Problems in the Czech Economy. Moct-Most 3 (1994) 59-70. 
Ibid. 62. 
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Prager Zeitung no. 40, 1992. 
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from the Fund for National Property. One may perhaps have expected that this sum 
would have been allocated from the statě budget, as indeed is common practice in 
most market economies. The Czech government circumvented this, thus not endange-
ring the budget balance. 
What should be noted here is that this measure benefited the banks, and not the 
enterprises which were the source of the problém. The establishment of the Bank was 
a necessary measure to direct fresh capital into the banking sector, but the Statutes of 
the Bank failed to statě what the criteria for transferral of bad loans should be, and 
much was left to the discretion of the Bank staff. Without clear guidelines, they 
rapidly became subject to pressure from the largest banks. As a result bad loans conti­
nued to be relocated from the commercial banks to the Consolidation Bank. More-
over, when some of the smaller banks collapsed early in 1994, the loans involved were 
transferred to the Consolidation Bank. Therefore, bad loans other than those dating 
from the period of planning have also ended up in the Consolidation Bank. N o specific 
measures existed protecting the Bank from accepting new loans. The commercial 
banks could apply for transfer, but the Consolidation Bank board decided whether 
these loans should be purchased. Not until latě summer 1993 was a meeting convened 
by the National Bank to draw up new guidelines. What the effects have been remain 
unclear. 
The Bank was, by virtue of its involvement, transformed into a potent tool for the 
government, and a tool it apparently wants to preserve. At the beginning of 1994, 
there seemed to have been a change in the plans for the Bank's future. The generál 
director announced that it would be transformed into a commercial bank with a range 
of Services not differing substantially from any other 1 0 1 . This Statement was issued at 
a time when the Bank had started to play a active role in business transactions going 
beyond the initial conceptual function of the bank as a reliéf organ for the banking 
sector. The Bank has headed a group of commercial banks providing fresh credits for 
a large chemical plant 1 0 2. Moreover, after two years of Air France ownership of shares 
in CSA (Czechoslovak Airlines), the Czech government managed to persuade Air 
France to seli its shares to the Consolidation Bank 1 0 3. The government could have opted 
for a re-transfer of the shares to the Fund for National Property. Deciding to allow the 
Bank to become holder of the shares not only strengthened the Bank's long-term prof­
it perspectives, but also signalled that the Bank no longer was to be a solely transition­
al measure. This was confirmed early in 1995, when Roman Češka declared that the 
Bank was among those assets that although they could be, they would not be privatiz­
ed 1 0 4 . The National Bank has long desired such a move, and has been opting for allo-
cating some official Services like the administration of statě boards to the Bank 1 0 5. 
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By 1994, the Consolidation Bank had become the fifth largest creditor Bank in the 
Czech Republic. Yet its influence extends much further, the Bank was creditor to 
approx. 80 per cent of all large- and medium-scale enterprises I 0 6. Whereas the govern­
ment showed little interest in taking advantage of its role as shareholder when the 
enterprises were in possession of the Fund, the activity displayed by the Bank in busi­
ness transactions as well as the expansion plans, seems to indicate a change toward a 
far more active statě policy concerning enterprise management. One opportunity to 
do so would be posed by enterprises entering into bankruptcy proceedings. The role 
of the Bank as creditor means that its representatives will participate in negotiations 
that will decide whether an enterprise will survive or not. 
The bankruptcy law 
Another way of avoiding bank collapse was to prevent enterprise collapse by 
restraining the possibility of bankruptcies. Yet such an option would contradict the 
contents of the "Scenario" since introducing market forces implied exit mechanisms 
for enterprises producing at a loss. Moreover, restraining the exit option would mean 
that the statě would have to foot the bili. This had been the čase when a few enterprises 
were closed by the Ministry for Industry and Trade. AU enterprise debts had to be 
covered by the Ministry. It was considered far more advantageous to privatize an en­
terprise, even if the sum obtained was negligible107. 
A law on bankruptcy was passed by Parliament in October 1991. The political 
Statements accompanying the debatě on the implementation of the law clearly show­
ed a very reluctant attitude. When explaining the postponement of the law, Mini­
ster of Industry Dyba declared that "the Czech government was not calling for bank­
ruptcies and would not initiate them" 1 0 8 . This view was shared by Prime Minister 
Klaus, who stated that the introduction of the law would be "inappropriate given the 
current economic environment here" 1 0 9 . Politically, it was untenable to claim that the 
market had been introduced when a bankruptcy law was lacking. Nevertheless, when 
the last postponement expired in Apríl 1993, the law remained virtually without effect. 
Despite widespread insolvency in the enterprise sphere, the number of bankruptcies 
only amounted to 60 in 1993 and 288 the following year1 1 0. Private entrepreneurs 
agricultural and housing cooperatives make up the largest share, larger industrial 
enterprises being virtually absent from the list. 
Alone the intertwining of ownership between the statě and the funds is a powerful 
deterrent against bankruptcies. Yet, the law contains a number of conditions and pro-
tectionist clauses that not only reinforces this effect, but clearly shows the governmenťs 
intention of preserving füll employment. For instance, in all cases of all enterprises 
B r o m / O r e n s t e i n : The Privatised Sector in the Czech Economy: Government and 
Bank Control in a Transitional Economy 901. 
Lecture by Jaroslav Borák, Director of metallurgy, machine industry and electrical engineer-
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affected by voucher privatization, i. e. the great majority, bankruptcy proceedings can­
not be opened before the change of ownership was terminated and new owners inf ormed. 
Whether that means that the enterprises where the Fund for National Property still has 
shares are exempt, since the Fund may argue that the transfer of property rights has not 
been finalised, is not known. Even in cases where all shares have been transferred to new 
owners, the statě can intervene and prevent a bankruptcy. The law specifies that the 
creditor and debitor will be given a time limit of 90 days for negotiating a settlement. 
But this time limit can be exceeded if an economically important enterprise is involved 
or if the court believes that an extention would be in the interest of the public 
The government decides when this paragraph may be invoked. If so, the Consolida­
tion Bank can intervene with assistance. But in order to do this, exactly the samé mea­
sures must be taken and requirements fulfilled that the government had seemed 
unwilling to enter into during the privatization process. A fixed set of criteria must be 
developed to provide a genuine picture of the enterprise's financial health. The Con­
solidation Bank must be strengthened with sufficient staff to undertake long term 
monitoring. 
The law opened up the possibility that the banks could initiate court proceed­
ings against enterprises defaulting their loans. Yet it was feared that this would 
lead to a domino effect, where the stoppage of production in one enterprise would 
have wide repercussions for other enterprises1 1 2. This was also the reason why the 
banks clearly voiced that they were against the bankruptcy law, and that they did not 
have any intention of introducing legal measures against insolvent companies. In špite 
of the demonopolization procedures that had been undertaken to break up the 
large monopolies, the links between producers and sub-deliverers were still 
close1 1 3. 
The official resistance to introducing a fully operational bankruptcy law is due to 
the fact that the collapse of one enterprise would spark off a row of bankruptcies. This 
fear is due to the links between the enterprises in one industrial sector which 
functioned as a network during planning. Although the demonopolization and de-
etatization of the enterprises has changed this, at least formally, the network between 
the sub-deliverer and the producer of the finished product is so intimate that detrimen-
tal effects would surely be felt. The interrelatedness of the enterprises has further been 
strengthened by the inter-enterprise debts. Those enterprises that could sue another 
for bankruptcy will usually not do it, because it would virtually eliminate their chan-
ces of recovering the debts. 
To prevent bankruptcy proceedings from being introduced against an enterprise, 
the law opened up statě financial support to those that would stand a chance of 
surviving. If no comparable employment can be found within a reasonable distance, 
the statě could provide financial assistance. Of the 76 local government districts, 
16 were claimed to fulfill this requirement1 1 4. The financial aid from the statě will be 
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administered through the Consolidation Bank through purchases of the insolvent 
enterprises' loans. A sum will be set aside by the Fund for National Property for 
this purpose; 10 billion Kč were mentioned as a potential limit1 1 5. But the law allowed 
for direct subsidies from the statě budget if this sum would not suffice. 
The parts of the Czech Republic with the highest unemployment levels are also 
regions with high concentrations of heavy industry. This means that there will be 
strong disincentives for the government to allow bankruptcy proceedings to be intro-
duced against the samé sector many had recommended should be reduced prior to 
1989, at a time when they were working as scientists. 
An economy in search of an adjective 
On 1 January 1995, the second and final wave of the coupon privatization ended. 
Recalling Prime Minister Klaus Statements to the Czech Economic Society in 1993 
(see notě 12), Privatization Minister Jiří Skalický declared that the most important 
phase of privatization had ended 1 1 6 . That may be so, but the state's ownership remains 
pervasive. The Fund for National Property remains with either a majority or the lar­
gest number of shares in many enterprises. On average, the Fund holds 20 per cent of 
the book value, with the mainly state-owned banks possessing a further 40 per cent 1 1 7 . 
If one adds to this the fact that the Consolidation Bank is a major creditor to the enter­
prise sphere, statě omnipotence is evident. 
There are some conclusions that should be drawn from this. The most evident is that 
the concept 'privatization' is inappropriate. What has happened is a partial de-etatiza-
tion of the economy. Klaus' definition of transformation as a comprehensive change 
affecting the entire systém cannot be applied to the Czech transition because the 
financial problems at enterprise level have remained. There have been no comprehen­
sive attempts to solve them; instead ad hoc Solutions that were intended as temporary 
emergency Operations have become a permanent feature: e.g. the Consolidation 
Bank, the impotent bankruptcy law, and of course statě ownership. The most recent 
Suggestion by the government to grant industrial enterprises tax reliéf to enable them 
to pay their debts 1 1 8 contradicts all political pledges aimed at ending the old systém of 
"social indolence" (see footnote 2). This policy does not only mean less income for the 
statě, but also less capital available for private entrepreneurs starting from Scratch. 
There is little doubt that the overriding concern for the policymakers has been the 
need to retain social peace and through this political stability. In the "Scenario", the 
need to let social considerations decide the páce of economic reforms was understood 
to be an argument in favor of rapid reforms. The concern has remained consistent, 
but the outcome has been marked by considérable pragmatism. An effective bank­
ruptcy law, refusing financial aid to banks and enterprises, would certainly have led 
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to massive unemployment with disastrous effects for the reforms. It would have 
alienated large sections of the population and provide fertile ground for extremist 
groups. Thus, including political stability as a criterion for evaluating economic 
reforms will yield a more positive conclusion than would have been possible if the 
focus had been restricted to the efficiency of market mechanisms. 
But political stability is an elusive quality. An analysis of the Czech transition 
should therefore focus on whether the government has taken advantage of it to build 
the institutional preconditions for a political stability that can resist the pressures of 
economic crisis and social unrest. It is easy to forget that the economy moves in cycles, 
and that the boom we are experiencing at present may be as short-lived as it is recent. 
Admitting that, an assessment is far more challenging than merely asking to what 
degree the Czech economy has moved toward its goal. N o clear-cut answer can be 
given, and based on the discussion of the state's role in the economy presented here, a 
conclusion cannot avoid being contradictory. The voucher privatization was a success 
in that it created populär support for the transition. But it has disguised the considér­
able role played by the statě. The numerous Solutions applied by the government in 
support of the economy seem less to be the outcome of a grander stratégy or precon-
ceived plan than of ad hoc Solutions. That is understandable given the turmoil any 
transition from one economic mode to another is bound to produce, but what is wor-
rying is that the statě so far has only been ušed as an emergency saviour. Although the 
banks can be said to have initiated important measures aimed at a long-term restruc­
turing of the enterprises, the lack of efficient exit mechanisms has erased the possibi-
lity of hard budget constraints for the former nationalized enterprises. That will deter 
any radical change at the enterprise level toward more market adequate behav-
iour. That is not to say that everything persists as it did prior to 1989, but it illustrates 
to what extent economic development is constrained when the political understanding 
of statě participation in the economy is viewed negatively, and, when resorted to, is 
not given any clear-cut guidelines. 
In this perspective, the fact that statě support for the enterprise sphere is provided is 
of secondary importance. What should be criticized is the manner in which statě aid 
and ownership are undertaken. The government is at present using statě ownership to 
bail out large-scale industrial enterprises. Social peace is retained, but the lack of trans-
parency has so far undermined any efforts to create a predictable institutional frame-
work for the economy to develop, irrespective of whether the government has settled 
for Thatcherite liberalism or a mixed economy with a large say for the statě. In that 
respect, the ad hoc development of statě participation in the economy has undermined 
the overriding aim of any transition: creation of a predictable framework for the econ­
omy. With increasing predictability, enterprise managers can start restructuring the 
manufacturing process, and statě support can be given to development of new indus­
trial items instead of simply keeping the enterprises afloat. If Western demand for 
cheap, semi-processed goods is reduced, or the export of Ukrainian ore ceases, the 
political leadership will find it extremely difficult to impose a limit on how far statě 
support can extend, in particular since no advantage was taken of the present period 
when social tension is low. In that respect, the long-term political consequences of the 
economic transition may well be negative. 
